soapbox

 the State also appeals the district court's ruling that the SEVGL's labeling, brochure and signage provisions constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court recently observed, some of its "leading First Amendment precedents have established the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say." Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 164 L. Ed. 2d 156 (2006) (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943) and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977)). The Court has stated that where a statute " [m]andat [es] speech that a speaker would not otherwise make," that statute "necessarily alters the content of the speech." See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 1

blagovitch. 2006  in  1997 the 7th denied majors v abell, on the basis of a temporary uncertainty resulting from mconnell v fec. this uncertainty faded as more bcra cases came down, wrtl i and ii, davis, cruz, etc. 

the 7th has reentered the mainstream of american law in cases such as Blagovitch (2006) Mulholland and NIFLA. Mulholard (2014?) was a procedural dispute not on the merits. It concerned an Indiana slating statute void under McIntyre. no one suggested that majors was still a factor. the case settled below for 70k.     

Recently in NIFLA the 7th again followed s ct precedent, ruling that Indiana could not require disclaimers at pregnancy crisis centers.

ok i need dthe cites for that.