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Sunday, December 24, 2017

 The Long March of Fong Eu.

Earlier this week March Fong Eu died of natural causes in her 90s. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_Fong_Eu
She was California's first Asian elected official. If things had gone differently, she might have been CA's first female senator.
She was among other things a mom. Her son Matt Fong has served as CA Treasurer; the mother had been secretary of state for multiple terms.

Her name is on a Supreme Court case I have relied on in my own cases, Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989), which continued a dispute where the court had remanded for reconsieration in light of Tashjian.


I dont see any mention of the case at her wikipedia page. I suggested a fix.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:March_Fong_Eu#needs_update_on_her_federal_and_state_supreme_court_cases

Hmm I've been misspelling Tashijian.


The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 792 F.2d 802 (1986). This Court vacated that decision, 479 U.S. 1024 (1987), and remanded for further consideration in light of Tashijian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U. S. 208 (1986).


I found this concurrence of note.



JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
Today the Court relies on its opinion in Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173440 U. S. 183-185 (1979) -- and, in particular, on a portion of that opinion that I did not join -- for its formulation of the governing standards in election cases. In that case, JUSTICE BLACKMUN explained his acceptance of the Court's approach in words that precisely express my views about this case. He wrote:
"Although I join the Court's opinion, . . . I add these comments to record purposefully, and perhaps somewhat belatedly, my unrelieved discomfort with what
Page 489 U. S. 234
seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as 'compelling [state] interest' and 'least drastic [or restrictive] means....

I'm going to quote a few snippets from the 8-0 case as part of a quote bank I mean to someday build.


A State's broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections
"does not extinguish the State's responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the State's citizens."
The longer quote is:

A State's broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections
"does not extinguish the State's responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the State's citizens."
Tashijian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. at 479 U. S. 217. To assess the constitutionality of a state election law, we first examine whether it burdens rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 479 U. S. 214Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780460 U. S. 789 (1983). If the challenged law burdens the rights of political parties and their members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows that it advances a compelling state interest, Tashijian, supra, at 479 U. S. 217479 U. S. 222Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173440 U. S. 184 (1979); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767415 U. S. 780, and n. 11 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23393 U. S. 31 (1968), and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, Illinois Bd. of Elections, supra, at 440 U. S. 185Kusper v. Pontikiss, 414 U. S. 51414 U. S. 58-59 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330405 U. S. 343(1972).


We first consider California's prohibition on primary endorsements by the official governing bodies of political parties. California concedes that its ban implicates the First Amendment, Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, but contends that the burden is "miniscule." Id. at 7. We disagree. The ban directly affects speech, which "is at the core of our electoral
Page 489 U. S. 223
process and of the First Amendment freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 393 U. S. 32
We have recognized repeatedly that "debate on the qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1424 U. S. 14 (1976) (per curiam); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886458 U. S. 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455447 U. S. 467 (1980); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64379 U. S. 74-75 (1964). Indeed, the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application" to speech uttered during a campaign for political office. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265401 U. S. 272 (1971); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214,384 U. S. 218 (1966). Free discussion about candidates for public office is no less critical before a primary than before a general election. Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724415 U. S. 735 (1974); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649321 U. S. 666 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299313 U. S. 314 (1941). In both instances, the "election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office." Illinois Bd. of Elections, supra, at 440 U. S. 186.





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